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The border effects in Spain: an industry-level analysis
Francisco Requena • Carlos Llano
Abstract A gravity-model approach is used to estimate the magnitude of the internal border 
(home bias) and external border (frontier) effects in Spain using industry-level trade ﬂows. We 
ﬁnd that the average border effects are about 30 and 10, respectively. Next we explore the 
variation in the industry-speciﬁc border effects. First, the border effects are larger in highly 
product differentiated industries. Second, the internal border effect is twice bigger for trade in 
intermediate goods than for trade in ﬁnal goods. Third, conditioning on the geographic 
concentration of ﬁrms reduces signiﬁcantly the internal border effect.
Keywords Gravity model  Bilateral exports  Border effect
JEL Classiﬁcation F14  F17  F21  L14
1 Introduction
As global trade barriers are being steadily dismantled and economies are becoming 
increasingly integrated, one would expect national boundaries to have a diminishing effect on 
trade ﬂows. Nevertheless, recent empirical research using data on interregional and 
international merchandise trade ﬂows ﬁnds that a pair of regions within a country tends to 
trade 10 20 times as much as an otherwise identical pair of
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regions across countries.1 Other authors ﬁnd that countries tend to trade with themselves 4 20 
times more than with another country.2 A last strand of literature has focused on the 
magnitude of the domestic market fragmentation when intraregional trade ﬂows are available. 
Ceteris paribus, intraregional trade is roughly 2 20 times greater than interregional trade.3
After several studies have estimated the magnitude of the border effects, the next issue on 
the agenda research is to search for possible reasons explaining why the administrative and 
national borders matter so much in trade. As pointed out by Evans (2003), the previous 
estimated border results are economically meaningless if we do not know the underlying 
forces that cause the volume of local transactions to exceed the volume of trade with other 
partners. There are a number of factors that may explain the downward impact of boundaries 
on the volume of trade: tariffs, non-tariff barriers, information and transaction cost differences, 
the ‘‘origin’’ of the product, the elasticity of substitution between local and foreign goods, the 
geographic location of ﬁrms and the importance of intermediate goods. As it was explained in 
Chen (2004), the different reasons that explain the border effects have different welfare 
consequences and policy implications. If border effects reﬂect the existence of national or 
regional barriers to trade, there will be some room for increased market integration (a 
reduction of such a border effect) through the removal of these barriers. By contrast, if the 
border effect is mainly induced by the agglomeration of intermediate and ﬁnal goods 
producers in a speciﬁc nation or region, the nature of the effect is mainly ‘‘endogenous’’, and 
the possibility to reduce the border through policy is less clear. Moreover, since the 
exogenous and endogenous forces driving the border effect are not mutually exclusive, and 
could interact differently depending on the sectoral structure of a region, it would be 
convenient to analyse the size and nature of the effect at the industry level.
In this paper we estimate both the internal and external border effects in Spain. We 
measure the internal border effect asking how many times a region trades more with itself 
than with another (non-adjacent) region of the same country. We measure the external border 
effect asking how many times a region trades more with another region of the same country 
than with any other (non-adjacent) country. For that purpose we use industry-level trade ﬂows 
within each of the 17 Spanish regions, between Spanish regions and between each Spanish 
region and each one of the OECD countries for the year 1995 and 2000. Next, we try to 
explain why border effects vary substantially across industries. First, we examine the extent of 
product differentiation across industries in order to estimate the tariff equivalent border effect. 
Second, we check whether the magnitude of the internal border effect is
1 The external border effect or frontier effect has been studied by McCallum (1995), Helliwell (1996,
1998), Anderson and Smith (1999), Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), Okubo (2004), Gil et al. (2005).
2 Wei (1996), Head and Mayer (2000), Nitsch (2000), Evans (2003) and Chen (2004). These papers all calculated 
domestic trade as gross output minus exports, a ‘‘rough’’ estimate of intra national trade ﬂows.
3 Helliwell (1996), Wolf (2000), Hillberry and Hummels (2003), Millimet and Osang (2007) and Combes et al. (2005) 
ﬁnd an internal border effect between 2 and 6 in Canada, USA and France. Djankov and Freund (2000), Poncet 
(2003) and Daumal and Zignago (2008) ﬁnd an internal border effect between 11 and 20 in ex former USSR, China 
and Brazil.
sensitive to the type of product use (intermediate goods versus ﬁnal goods). Third, we 
examine the relation between the industrial concentration and the internal border effect.
Our empirical investigation of the border effects yields several ﬁndings that are particularly 
interesting and novel. To begin, we estimate two different border effects, the internal or 
interregional border) and the external or frontier border). Our analysis reveals that the internal 
border effect is larger than the external border effect. Ceteris paribus, a typical Spanish region 
trades with itself about 17 (30 for manufactures) times more than with other non-adjacent 
Spanish region. In other words, ceteris paribus, a typical Spanish region trade with another 
non-adjacent Spanish region 13 (10 for manufactures) times more than with a non adjacent 
country.
Second, we observe large variation in the border effects at industry level. The internal 
border effect ranges across industries between 6 and 45 and the international 
border effect ranges between 4 and 156 in non-adjacent trade. Moreover, we 
observe a negative correlation between the internal and external border effects across 
industries. This is mainly explained by two non-manufacturing industries (mining and energy 
& water), which exhibit low internal border effects and high external ones compared to the 
manufacturing industries.
Third, after accounting for the importance of the degree of product differentiation across 
industries, the tariff-equivalent of the border barriers is smaller than in the case of no 
taking into account product differentiation. Moreover, conditioning on product 
differentiation reduces more the external border effect than the internal border effect. 
Nevertheless, the tariff-equivalent border barriers remain still high.
Fourth, the large magnitude of the internal border effects is largely explained by the high 
volume short-distance intermediate goods trade. This is a novel ﬁnding since it is the ﬁrst time 
that interregional trade ﬂows are split into ﬁnal use goods and intermediate use goods. 
Finally, the internal border effects are substantially diminished once we control for the 
geographic concentration of the industry. Therefore, our ﬁndings suggest that the intra-
national border effect at the regional level is partially caused by endogenous forces, and not 
just by tariff or non-tariff impediments to trade.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the methodological framework and 
the empirical model used. Section 3 describes the data set. Section 4 discusses the main 
estimation results. Section 5 analyses the factors that help to explain the border effects 
variation across industries. Finally, Sect. 6 concludes the paper.
2 The empirical model
The gravity equation has been widely and successfully used to analyse the border effects. 
The gravity equation states that bilateral trade between two geographic areas is directly 
proportional to their economic sizes and inversely proportional to the distance between them. 
At the industry level, the gravity equation considered here takes the following basic 
speciﬁcation (Chen 2004):
ln Xij;k ¼ b0 þ b1 ln Yi;k þ b2 ln Yj þ b3 ln Dij þ b4ADJREGij þ b5ADJCOUij
þ b6OWNREGij þ b7SPAINij þ ai;k þ aj;k þ eij;k
ð1Þ
where subscript i indicates an exporting Spanish region, j indicates an importing Spanish 
region or an importing foreign country and k indicates a speciﬁc industry. Xij,k is the exports 
from region i to region (country) j in industry k, expressed in euros; Yi,k is the production of 
exporter i in industry k; Yj is the market size of the importer j;4 Dij is the geodesic distance 
between i and j. These variables are expressed in logs. We include two additional variables to 
capture contiguity. ADJREG is a dummy variable equal to one when two Spanish regions 
share a common border, and zero otherwise. ADJCOU is a dummy variable equal to one 
when a Spanish region and a foreign country share a common border, and zero otherwise. In 
order to estimate the effects of crossing a border in this framework, we include two additional 
explanatory variables. OWNREG is a dummy equal to 1 for intra-regional trade and 0, 
otherwise (OWNREG = 1 i f  i = j). SPAIN is a dummy equal to 1 for trade between two 
Spanish regions and 0 for international trade or intraregional trade (SPAIN = 1 i f  i, j 
[ SPAIN and i = j). The internal border effect is equal to expð^b6  b^7Þ and measures how 
many times intraregional trade exceeds interregional trade. The external border effect is equal 
to expðb^7Þ and measures how many times interregional trade exceeds international trade.
Finally, to ensure the correct speciﬁcation of the gravity model, we also need to take into 
account the magnitude of alternative trading opportunities faced by the members of each 
bilateral trading pair; the so-called ‘‘multilateral resistance’’ terms, whose omission leads to 
over-estimate the border effect (Anderson and van Wincoop 2003). Since the multilateral 
resistance terms are generally not observable, it is common practice to use importer and 
exporter ﬁxed effects to replace the resistance terms, an approach that gives consistent 
estimates and is easy to implement (Feenstra 2002). Since we work with sectoral trade ﬂows, 
we include industry-speciﬁc exporter and importer ﬁxed-effects.
3 Data
The construction of the database includes intraregional trade ﬂows, the bilateral trade ﬂows 
between Spanish regions and the bilateral trade ﬂows between each Spanish region and 
each OECD country. The data set includes 17 Spanish regions (Nuts 2 level) and 28 OECD 
countries for the years 1995 and 2000.5 Trade ﬂows are
4 Evans (2003), Hillberry (2002) and Chen (2004) also use industry value added as a measure of
exporter´s economic size rather than origin region GDP to control for industry location patterns.
5 The OECD countries included in the study are: Australia (AUS), Austria (AUT), Belgium (BEL, Belgium 
and Luxemburg), Canada (CAN), Czech Republic (CZE), Denmark (DNK), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), 
Germany (DEU), Greece (GRC), Hungary (HUN), Iceland (ISL), Ireland (IRL), Italy (ITA), Japan (JPN), Korea 
(KOR), Mexico (MEX), Netherlands (NDL), New Zealand (NZL), Norway (NOR), Poland (POL), Portugal (PRT), 
Slovenia (SVK), Sweden (SWE), Switzerland (SWT), United Kingdom (UK), United States (USA).
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available for 15 different industries (at the 2-digit SIC rev. 3 level: agriculture, mining, 
energy&water and 12 manufacturing sectors). For each industry there are 765 observations: 
17 intra-region trade ﬂows, 272 interregional ﬂows (17 9 16) and 476 international export 
ﬂows from Spanish regions to each of the OECD countries (17 9 28). The sample covers a 
total of 11,220 observations per year (15 9 765).
The intra and interregional trade data comes from the C-intereg database (see www.c-
intereg.es, and Llano et al. 2008 for a description). The data was obtained for each sector 
using domestic transport volume ﬂows of goods and translated into ‘‘monetary ﬂows’’ by 
means of unit prices derived from detailed branch surveys. The transport statistics used in the 
estimation of Spanish interregional trade include origin destination ﬂows by the following 
modes of transport: road (Permanent Survey on Road Transport of Goods, Ministerio de 
Fomento), railway (Complete Wagon and Containers ﬂows, RENFE), sea (Spanish Ports 
Statistics, Puertos del Estado), air (O/D Matrices of Domestic ﬂows of goods by airport of 
Origin and Destination, AENA), pipe (O/D matrix of oil ﬂows using pipe, CLH) and electricity 
(Red Ele´ctrica de Espan˜a). We combine data on transport ﬂows with additional information 
related to the output per regions and sectors (Industrial Enterprises Survey, INE) in order to 
constrain the interregional transport ﬂows such that they are consistent with National and 
Regional Accounts (INE).6 The data on bilateral trade between Spanish regions and OECD 
countries in the sample are taken from the Direccio´n General de Aduanas. The ﬁgures are 
expressed in current Euros.
There is no data on regional gross production by industry in Spain. Therefore we use value 
added as a measure of economic size. Regional value added by industry at market prices is 
reported in Regional Accounts (INE). Industry-speciﬁc value added for each one of the OECD 
countries is taken from the OECD STAN 2005 database and the OECD input output table 
2006 database. International value added ﬁgures were converted to current Euros using the 
period-average market exchange rate as reported in WDI 2005 on-line database.
We follow Head and Mayer (2000) and Gil et al. (2005) to construct the distance variable. 
To obtain the distances between Spanish regions we consider those cities with more than 
20,000 inhabitants within Spain. For each city in one region we calculate a weighted average 
of the great circle distance (in kilometres) from this city to the other cities in each partner 
region, in which the weights are the respective populations of the latter. Once this value is 
calculated for all cities in a region we again calculate a weighted average based on 
populations within each region. Distances between each region and each foreign country in 
the sample are calculated considering the distances between the province capital cities of 
each Spanish region and the ﬁve most important cities of each partner country. The weighting 
procedure is the same as deﬁned above.7 Descriptive statistics of all the variables employed 
in this paper are presented in the ‘‘Appendix’’.
6 Llano (2004b) describes in detail the harmonization method, the estimation of non available data, the
debugging procedure for transport ﬂows in physical units and the estimation of value/weight relations from 
international trade statistics.
7 The great circle distance between i’s and j’s cities is calculated as follows. First we transform the
latitude uj and the longitude k into radians (xp/360). Second, the formula used to calculate the distance
between the pair of cities is Dij  kj ki; dij arccos sin ui sin uj þ cos ui cos uj cos Dij
 
z; with
4 Econometric estimation and basic results
We estimate Eq. 1 using a Tobit procedure in order to tackle the large proportion of zero 
observations in our data set: about 21% of the bilateral exports are equal to zero (4% 
corresponding to interregional trade ﬂows and the rest correspond to international trade 
ﬂows). Since the zero observations contain information about why such low levels of trade are 
observed, it would be inappropriate to eliminate them. Since the dependent variable is 
expressed in logs, we sum 1 to the trade ﬂow level before taking logs. The Tobit coefﬁcients 
are not direct estimates of the elasticities, but those at the sample means can be recovered 
by the McDonald and Mofﬁt (1980) procedure.8
Table 1 contains the estimates corresponding to different speciﬁcations of Eq. 1. Column 1 
presents the simplest gravity equation: trade ﬂows as a function of origin and destination 
value added, distance and the dummies capturing the border effects. The results for all 
tradable goods show the elasticity of trade with respect to origin value added to be greater 
than unity, the elasticity of trade with respect to destination value added to be close to unity 
and the elasticity with respect to distance to be greater than one in absolute value. The 
internal border effect is 14.7 [= exp(4.91 - 2.22)] and the international border effect is 9.2 [= 
exp(2.22)]. This implies that, ceteris paribus, intraregional trade is roughly 15 times greater 
than interregional trade and interregional trade is roughly nine times greater than international 
trade.
Column 2 conditions on the neighbour (adjacency) status and the frontier (adjacency) 
status with France and Portugal. The results show that regions are more likely to trade with 
adjacent regions and with contiguous countries, than they do with otherwise similar regions 
and countries. Indeed, controlling for adjacency affects signiﬁcantly the magnitude of the 
border effects. The internal border effect almost triplicates as a region trades about 22 times 
more with itself than with a non-adjacent Spanish region and regions trade about 16 more 
with other non-adjacent Spanish regions than with other non-adjacent countries. Next we 
include origin and destination ﬁxed-effects across industries in order to control for omitted 
relative prices. Column 3 shows that the economic impact of crossing the border is greatly 
reduced. This ﬁnding lends support to the results obtained by Anderson and van Wincoop 
(2003) in that omitting relative prices leads to over-estimate the elasticity of trade with respect 
to trade impediments. The coefﬁcients on distance and border effect are smaller than those in 
Column 2. The internal border effect falls from 22 to 17 and the external border effect falls 
from 16.3 to 13.
Gravity-type theoretical models ﬁnd that the coefﬁcients on the income variables should be 
equal to one. In column 4 a unit elasticity is imposed on exporter production and importer 
consumption by passing them to the left hand of the
Footnote 7 continued
z = 6,367 for km. Third, we calculate the population weighted average distance between the cities by
region and by country using the same formula Dr;r0 
P
i2r wið
P
i2r0 wjdijÞ; wi popi=popr .8 Head and Mayer (2002) and Chen (2004) use the same approach in their analysis of the home country bias in 
Europe using industry levels trade ﬂows.
regressions equation so the dependent variable is Xij,k/Yi,kYj. We find that the
magnitude of the border effects declines until 13.2 for the internal one and until 8
for the external one. Column 5 restricts the sample to the manufacturing goods,
eliminating three out of fifteen industries (agriculture, mining, energy and water).
The results are similar to those obtained for the sample of all tradable goods. The
main difference is that the internal border effect almost doubles (29.7) and the
international border effect decreases slightly (10.4) when just manufactures are
taken into account. Finally, column 6 includes an additional variable to control for
the weight-to-value relationship.9 As expected, weight-to-value has a negative
impact on bilateral exports, reflecting the higher freight component of costs of bulky
manufactures, though the coefficient is weakly significant. Nevertheless, the
magnitude of the estimated border effects remains the same.
Table 1 Average border effects
(1)
Tradables
(2)
Tradables
(3)
Tradables
(4)
Tradables
(5)
Manufactures
(6)
Manufactures
In Yi,k 1.33**
(64.00)
1.32**
(63.86)
1.00**
(24.48)
1 1.09**
(20.95)
1.09**
(20.95)
In Yj 0.94**
(83.67)
0.92**
(82.91)
0.96**
(46.17)
1 0.99**
(42.14)
0.99**
(43.14)
In Dij 1.25**
(37.08)
1.08**
(30.28)
1.02**
(31.60)
0.67**
(12.73)
0.98**
(27.71)
0.97**
(27.38)
ADJREGij 1.71**
(12.15)
1.50**
(12.46)
1.26**
(32.51)
1.40**
(11.16)
1.40**
(10.68)
ADJCOUij 2.34**
(6.95)
2.23**
(6.88)
0.80**
(7.82)
2.20**
(6.36)
2.19**
(6.50)
In
WEIGHTk
0.11*
(1.76)
OWNREGij 4.91**
(14.39)
5.88**
(17.92)
5.44**
(15.92)
4.67**
(50.12)
5.73**
(16.01)
5.71**
(16.00)
SPAINij 2.22**
(16.76)
2.79**
(16.27)
2.57**
(12.01)
2.09**
(25.74)
2.34**
(11.02)
2.34**
(12.28)
Fixed
effects
No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.10 0.11 0.14 0.24 0.14 0.14
N 22440 22440 22440 22440 17952 17952
Estimated border effects
Internal 14.7 22.0 17.6 13.2 29.7 29.1
External 9.2 16.3 13.1 8.1 10.4 10.4
Tobit estimations, sample mean elasticities. T values are reported in parentheses. ‘‘Fixed effects’’ indi
cates whether industry specific exporter and importer dummies are included. t statistics in parentheses
with ** denoting significance at the 5% level and * significance at the 10% level
9 Following Chen (2004), ehe weight to value measure is industry specific and averaged across all
region country pairs,
P
i
P
j Qij;k=
P
i
P
j Xij;k where Qij,k is the weight of bilateral international exports
Xij,k.
To summarise, the internal border effect is larger than the international border
effect in Spain. Inter-regional flows between two non-contiguous regions are about
17 (30 for manufactures) times lower than intra-regional ones, a higher internal
border effect compared to previous studies for Canada (Helliwell and Verdier 2001),
USA (Wolf 2000) and France (Combes et al. 2005), with values of 2, 6 and 9,
respectively. Meanwhile, international flows between a Spanish region and a non-
contiguous country are about 13 (10 for manufactures) times lower than inter-
regional ones. Our estimated external border effect is similar to the one found by
Nitsch (2002) for Germany over the period 1992 1994 but significantly smaller than
the value of 20 found by Gil et al. (2005) for Spain over the period 1995 1998.10
The difference in the results may be explained by the upward bias in the border
coefficient when aggregated trade flows are used rather than disaggregated trade
flows, as shown by Hillberry (2002).11 Moreover, in the case of Gil et al. (2005),
differences could also be explained by dissimilarities between the two databases. In
our case, the C-intereg database follows a homogenous methodology for every
region and includes data on energy and water, pipe flows and actual trade between
the Spanish peninsula and the non-peninsular regions. By contrast, the database
used in Gil et al. (2005) does not include these information and impose asymmetric
constrains regarding the intra/inter regional trade shares for the 9 (out of 17) regions
that had regional input output tables at that time. In fact, based on the different
results we obtain when manufactures are analyzed alone, which are closer to the Gil
et al. (2005) estimates, it seems that the inclusion of the Energy&Water industry
clearly make the difference, at least for the internal border effect.12
Border effects also differ across industries. Table 2 reports the results of
estimating industry-specific border coefficients. The coefficients on the gravitational
variables display the expected signs and statistically significant. All the coefficients
on the industry dummies interacted with OWNREG are larger than 1 and
statistically significant. There are three industry dummies interacted with SPAIN
(textile, clothing and leather, electric and electronic goods, transport equipment)
that are smaller than 2 and the one for transport equipment is not statistically
significant. The largest internal border coefficients are 45.6 for wood products, 37.3
for food and drinks, 35.2 for non metallic products and 29.4 for plastic and rubber.
At the opposite side of the spectrum, the smallest internal border effects are 3.4 for
mining, 6.8 for electric and electronic goods, 6.8 for chemical products and 8.0 for
energy and water. The largest external border coefficients are 186.8 for energy and
water and 159.6 for mining, while the smallest external border effects are 4.2 for
electric and electronic goods, 4.5 for mechanical machinery and 5.8 for transport
10 Of course, it is delicate to compare results of the diverse studies because they use different methods
and data. Therefore, we have to remain cautious concerning these comparisons.
11 When we used aggregated trade flows and replicated the specification of Gil et al. (2005) using
manufacturing sectors only, the magnitude of the external border effect was 15, a greater value than the
one obtained using industry specific trade flows.
12 The importance in absolute terms of the energy industry (electricity, gas and water) within the country,
together with the domestic nature of the Spanish distribution system, tends to magnify the external border
effect (it is the largest one) and diminish the internal border effect (it is among the smallest ones),
compared to any estimation that omits this important sector.
equipment. The internal border effects exhibit smaller variation than external ones;
the normalised standard deviation is 0.55 and 1.32, respectively. In addition, it
appears that industries with a large (small) internal border effect do not have
necessarily a large (small) external border effect (i.e. energy and water and mining);
indeed, the correlation coefficient between the two types of border effect is -0.39.
As we will analyse in the next section, the negative correlation between internal
and external border effects might be explained by the combination of various
factors. In some cases, the negative relationship might be explained by historical
events. In others, the motivation could be found in the idiosyncratic features of some
industries and the location decisions of the firms. Consider, for example, the
historical tendency of every country in Europe to be self-sufficient in some
‘‘strategic’’ sectors (food, metallurgy or energy). This policy crystallized in a low
level of trade with other countries (high external border effect), and the emergence
Table 2 Industry specific border effects
ln Yi,k 1.04** (26.10)
In Yj 0.98** (48.40)
In Dij 0.92** (41.68)
ADJREGij 1.49** (12.84)
ADJCOUij 2.26** (7.21)
Industry specific Industry specific Non adjacent trade border effects
OWNREG SPAIN Internal External
Agriculture 6.94** (7.48) 3.84** (12.65) 22.2 46.5
Mining 6.27** (7.64) 5.05** (19.24) 3.4 156.0
Energy & water 7.31** (8.94) 5.23** (19.17) 8.0 186.8
Food & drinks 7.23** (5.84) 3.61** (12.45) 37.3 37.0
Textile, clothing, leather 4.40** (4.89) 1.91** (5.25) 12.1 6.8
Wood products 6.53** (7.97) 2.71** (9.73) 45.6 15.0
Paper & printing 6.44** (7.19) 3.18** (11.94) 26.0 24.0
Chemicals 4.42** (5.30) 2.50** (9.12) 6.8 12.2
Rubber and plastic 5.46** (5.67) 2.08** (4.15) 29.4 8.0
Non metallic, mineral
products
7.52** (7.17) 3.96** (13.20) 35.2 52.5
Steel&metal products 6.41** (6.00) 3.57** (11.60) 17.1 35.5
Mechanical machinery 4.45** (4.90) 1.51** (2.03) 18.9 4.5
Electric&electronic goods 3.99** (2.55) 1.44** (2.34) 12.8 4.2
Transport equipment 4.57** (4.21) 1.75 (1.26) 16.8 5.8
Other manufactures 6.06** (6.12) 2.71** (5.91) 28.5 15.0
Pseudo R2 0.15
N 22440
Tobit estimations, sample mean elasticities. T values are reported in parentheses. All specifications
include industry specific exporter and importer dummies. t statistics in parentheses with ** denoting
significance at the 5% level and * significance at the 10% level
of a reduced group of highly specialised regions that provide goods for the rest of
the country (low internal border effect). Taking into account that Spain lived a long
period of autarky (three decades until 1959), the highly polarised pattern of
industrial concentration promoted a core-periphery structure within the country.
Non-surprisingly, the economic inertia derived from this concentration pattern
(some kind of Krugman’s ‘‘historical accident’’), also determined the optimal
location of new industries around the big regions even many years afterwards.
Consequently, although the Spanish regions have opened to international trade in
the last 40 years, the structure of the inter-regional trade is still conditioned by the
industrial concentration in some regions. This pattern makes compatible both large
internal border effects in certain industries (agriculture, food&drinks, mechanical
machinery) due to geographic agglomeration and low internal border effects in
others (chemicals, textiles and energy) due to strong inter-regional trade flows.
Moreover, this pattern is also compatible with finding high internal and low external
border effects in some specific industries. This will be the case of the automobile
industry, which is able to generate a strong cluster of downstream industries (with
high shares of intra-regional trade), while the final product is mainly exported
abroad. Similar reasons could be behind other inverse relations between the internal
and external border effects in other industries (like the energy & water, ceramics,
pharmaceutical and other chemical products) that are able to generate strong intra-
regional clusters and high international trade propensities.
Apart from these explanations, another motivation for an inverse correlation
between the internal and external border effect could also be derived from the
complex connection between the FDI and the inter-regional trade through the
logistic system and the intra-firm trade flows.13 Finally, there are others
explanations based on a competitive view of international and inter-regional trade
at the firm level.14 In the next section we investigate in more detail which factors
may explain the magnitude of the border effects across industries in Spain.
5 Explaining border effects
Trade frictions affect trade volumes through two channels. A direct effect occurs as
frictions change relative prices, inducing substitution towards proximate products.
The indirect effect occurs through co-location. Firms linked closely in the input
output structure locate nearby so as minimise trade costs. Thus border effects may
arise endogenously either as a result of a low degree of substitutability between
local and foreign products or as a consequence of the optimal location choices of
13 A specific industry in a region could account for long international inflows and low levels of inter
regional outflows. In some cases, this trade structure could fit with the typical one way trade predicted by
the Ricardian or the Heckscher Ohlin Vanek model. However, it could be just a consequence of intra firm
imports of products that would be distributed nationally through the internal network of the company.
14 Regarding this point, it has been argued that small and weakly internationalised companies in Spain
are fond of promoting international trade just when the national demand is weak, and vice versa.
producers. Alternatively, border effects may arise exogenously due to technical and non-
tariff barriers to trade together with information and transaction costs 
impediments.15
Focusing on the endogenous side of this phenomenon, it is convenient to analyze the 
relation between the border effect of a speciﬁc industry and the intermediate and ﬁnal nature 
of its output. In order to do so, we analyse the complex relation between the structure of 
trade, the location of ﬁrms and the upward/downward character-ization of an industry (Fujita 
et al. 1999; Amiti 2005, 2001; Davis and Weinstein 1999; Puga 1999).
First, it is helpful to consider that bilateral trade ﬂows are conditioned by the location of 
producers and employers (consumers). In fact, if the allocation of both were homogeneously 
distributed in a country without exogenous border impedi-ments, the shares of intra and 
interregional trade will be equal in every region. As a consequence, according to the gravity 
model, the intensity of bilateral trade between any pair of equidistant regions will be also 
equal. However, the intra/inter shares and the intensity of bilateral ﬂows will vary if 
concentration occurs.
As it has been described by Fujita et al. (1999), industrial concentration can arise as a 
consequence of the interaction of centripetal and centrifugal forces, which are caused by 
several mechanisms related to labour mobility (real wages differentials) and inter-industry 
input output linkages (need of intermediate inputs). Hence, the proﬁt maximising location of a 
ﬁrm will depend on product-market and factor-market considerations, and both depend on a 
large list of variables.
Although theory explains the propensity of intermediate and ﬁnal good industries to cluster 
in space, it is not clear whether intermediate product industries always follow ﬁnal-product 
industries or if the causality can also move in the other way round. It is important to highlight 
that depending on the direction of this causality loop, we expect to ﬁnd different patterns of 
trade and levels of border effect. For example, let us consider the case of a typical industrial 
region in Spain (or Europe) with a strong concentration of metallurgy and equipment goods. 
Historically, the location of the metal industry was explained by the presence of physical-
immobile endowments like transport infrastructures (maritime ports and railways) and a 
ﬂourishing ‘‘mining’’ industry (coal and steel). In this case, while the transport costs were high 
(they were higher for intermediate goods because of their high value-to-weight relations) the 
ﬁnal good industries (equipment, machinery, transport equipment) tend to cluster around the 
intermediate goods industries (mining and metallurgy), even if the big ﬁnal good markets were 
located far away. In this case, intermediate products will travel shorter distance than ﬁnal 
goods, and the border effect of the formers will be much lower than the one of the later. By 
contrast, if after several years, the mining industry declines, local wages increases and 
transport cost drops below a certain level, ﬁnal good industries will start importing 
intermediate goods from abroad (i.e. strong imports of coal and steel from Poland, China or 
India). Then, inter-regional trade would be substituted by international
15 Chen (2004) deﬁnes the ﬁrst group of factors as ‘‘behavioural responses to trade costs’’ and the second
group as ‘‘trade costs’’.
ﬂows, and the external and internal border effect of intermediate products in that region would 
decrease drastically.
Finally, we can consider a completely different situation, where intermediate industries 
tend to agglomerate around ﬁnal good industries, which themselves, have been optimally 
located around the largest metropolitan areas (looking for proximity to regulators, big markets 
of ﬁnal goods or qualiﬁed employees). This could be the case of a typical cluster of 
intermediate industries appearing around the ‘Electric and electronic industry’, the 
‘Pharmaceutical product industry’ or the ‘Car industry’. In this case, if we consider a highly 
differentiated ﬁnal good produced by a multinational ﬁrm working in these sectors (in the case 
of Spain, Ford in Valencia, Opel in Zaragoza, Renault in Valladolid and Citroen in Vigo), it is 
expected to ﬁnd strong inter-regional and inter-national exports of ﬁnal goods, together with 
large intra-regional trade of intermediates products. Based in this example intermediate goods 
tend to travel shortest distance than ﬁnal goods. Then, the external and internal border effects 
of the ﬁnal good industry will be low in that region, while the corresponding to the intermediate 
goods will be much higher.
Although these two ‘pure’ cases can help to illustrate the most common behaviours, 
alternative results can also be described when analyzing other pairs of industries with strong 
input output linkages and opposite tendencies to locate close to the metropolitan areas: 
chemicals-oil-reﬁnery, agriculture-food industry or paper-editing activities. Due to the 
complexity and recursive relation between trade, location and the nature of the products, it is 
hard to predict the patterns of industrial concentration and the magnitude of the border effect 
of a speciﬁc region or industry. Despite this complexity, some recent studies have found 
coincident features that may explain the differences in the external and internal border effect 
across industries. Forslid et al. (2002) show that industries exhibit different patterns of 
geographic concentration in Europe due to different characteristics such as the level of 
competence in the market (perfect vs. imperfect competition), the cost structure (constant vs. 
increasing returns to scale), the trading costs and the ﬁnal/intermediate nature of the output. 
They show that in industries such as ‘‘Chemicals’’, ‘‘Transport Equipment’’, ‘‘Machinery’’ and 
‘‘Metals’’, spatial concentration is mainly explained by moderate transport costs and strong 
input output linkages between intermediate and ﬁnal products in the same industry.
Moreover, regarding the relation between the nature of the product and the magnitude of 
the border effect, some authors have investigated to what extend the level of transport cost 
together with the different weight-to-value relations are also conditioning the length of the 
ﬂows and the magnitude of the border effect for intermediate and ﬁnal products. Wolf (2000) 
pointed out that intermediate goods trade generally covers shorter distances than does ﬁnal 
goods trade, leading him to argue that the clustering of intermediate stages of production 
might explain the magnitude of the internal border effect. Chen (2004) also showed a 
negative relation between the weight-to-value ratio and the bilateral trade, reﬂecting the 
higher freight component of costs of bulk commodities like concrete, stone, concrete products 
or mortars. With a similar focus, Head and Mayer (2002) analysed the relation between the 
border effect at the industry level and the transportability of the products. Using data for the 
EU, US and Canada, they found that inter-national and
inter-regional trade of some products like cement, concrete and soft drinks travelled the 
lowest distances (between 10 and 15% of the average manufacturing product) and 
registered the highest border effects.
Based on these considerations, in this section we examine three factors explaining the 
border effects. First, we need to take into account that the estimated border effects is the 
product of the elasticity of substitution times the tariff-equivalent border barrier. Therefore, if 
more differentiated goods exhibit high border effects, the ‘‘effective’’ border barrier will be 
smaller than the ‘‘estimated’’ border effect. Evans (2003) showed that border effect between 
domestic and international trade ﬂows in the US was largely explained by the elasticity of 
substitution across varieties. The present paper checks whether product differen-tiation has 
any impact on border effects in Spain and whether, if any, the impact is different for each type 
of border.
Second, we examine the role of intermediate goods. Based on the reasons 
aforementioned (Wolf 2000; Head and Mayer 2002; Chen 2004), we analyse to what extend 
intermediate goods trade generally covers shorter distances, being able to explain the 
magnitude of the internal border effect. We are able to check this hypothesis straightforwardly 
since the Spanish interregional trade ﬂow data for 1995 is split into ﬁnal and intermediate 
goods.
Finally we investigate whether the importance of border effects in interregional trade is 
conditioned by the microeconomics of distribution ﬁrm-localisation. Hillberry and Hummels 
(2003) used regional-level trade ﬂows for US ﬁnding that the spatial clustering of ﬁrms 
magniﬁes the internal border effects. Chen (2004) used country-level trade ﬂows and found 
that the spatial clustering of ﬁrms magniﬁed external border effects, respectively. Accordingly, 
our paper also checks for whether this alternative explanation for border effect can be 
validated by the data when focusing on the inter-regional trade ﬂows for Spain.
In order to examine the impact of product differentiation, the type of trade ﬂow (ﬁnal or 
intermediate) and spatial clustering on the border effects, the gravity equation is estimated 
over the pooled sample of industries, including the OWNREG (SPAIN) variable and an 
interaction term between OWNREG (SPAIN) and the explanatory variable of interest.16 The 
speciﬁcation is:
ln Xij;k ¼ ai;k þ aj;k þ b1 ln Yi;k þ b2 ln Yj þ b3 ln Dij þ b4ADJREGij þ b5ADJCOUij
þ b6OWNREGij þ b8zk þ c1ðOWNREGij  zkÞ þ b7SPAINij
þ c2ðSPAINij  zkÞ þ eij;k ð2Þ
The new speciﬁcation includes zk as an additional regressor to capture any intercept-shift 
effects on trade ﬂows. The sign and signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcients c1 and c2 on the interaction 
terms indicates whether industries with a particular characteristic zk display larger o smaller 
border effects. In addition, the magnitude of the OWNREG (SPAIN) and of the interaction 
coefﬁcients permits to assess the relative importance of each explanatory factor zk.
16 Evans (2003) and Chen (2004) use the same approach.
5.1 The interaction between border effects and product differentiation
Theory shows that the border effect is equal to the product of the elasticity of substitution 
between goods and the tariff-equivalent of the border barrier. Indeed, the tariff-equivalent of 
the border barrier is given by the exp[(border coefﬁcient)/(r)] - 1.17 As far as high border 
effects are associated with high elasticity of substitution between goods, the magnitude of the 
tariff equivalent border effect will become smaller. Thus, to provide economic signiﬁcance to 
the border effects, we need to know whether high border effects arise from high elasticities of 
substitution between local, national and imported goods.
Our proxies for differences across industries in elasticities include three 
variables: IIT, R&D and ADV. The variable IIT is the extent of intra-industry trade as 
proportion of the total trade within an industry, calculated using the Grubel-Lloyd index and 
international trade information. The variable R&D is the ratio of research and 
development expenditure to value added within an industry. The variable ADV is the 
ratio of advertising expenditure to sales within an industry. For the three variables, a higher 
value indicates a higher degree of differentiation, i.e. a lower elasticity of substitution.18
Table 3 shows the results after the variables OWNREG and SPAIN are interacted with 
each measure of product differentiation. All measures indicate that a higher degree of product 
differentiation is actually associated with a lower border effect. This suggests that high border 
effects are partially attributable to the elasticity of substitution between goods produced in 
different locations, and that higher border effects do not indicate large price wedges between 
varieties produced in different locations. For example, the coefﬁcient of -2.1 on the 
OWNREGxIIT interaction variable indicates that a perfect homogenous good (IIT = 0) will 
have an internal border effect of 33.4, while a product with some degree of product 
differentiated (mean IIT = 0.35) will have an internal border effect of 25.7. For the external 
border effect the values will be 12.3 in the case of IIT = 0 and 7.1 in the case of IIT = 0.35. 
While R&D as measure of product differentiation shows a similar result as IIT, the variable 
ADV only show a negative and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient for the interaction with SPAIN, but not 
with OWNREG. This might be due to the fact that product differentiation is more relevant to 
explain the international border effect rather than the home regional bias.
Next Table 4 displays the industry border effects for nonadjacent trade and the industry-
speciﬁc tariff-equivalent of the border barriers, i.e. expðb^kÞand exp½ðb^kÞ=ð^rkÞ  1; 
where ^bk refers to the coefﬁcient(s) on a industry-dummy-variable interacted with OWNREG 
and SPAIN variables obtained from Table 2 and r^k is the industry-speciﬁc elasticity of 
demand calculated using the IIT index.19
17 For a discussion, see Deardorff (1998)), Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) and Feenstra (2002).
18 The three measures are constructed using Spain as a geographic unit. IIT was constructed using international 
import and export (value and quantity) ﬂows. R&D was obtained from Estadı´stica de I ? D (INE) and ADV was 
obtained from Encuesta Industrial de Empresas (INE). For the variable ADV the agriculture sector is excluded due to 
lack of information.
19 We set the two endpoints of the elasticity range (2 6) to the minimum and maximum IIT index values (0.03 and 
0.66), and used linear interpolation to assign elasticities to the intervening industries, based on their ITT index 
values (as in Evans 2003).
For chemical goods, the tariff-equivalent internal border barrier is 51% and the tariff-
equivalent external border barrier is 56%; for the agricultural sector they are 92 and 114, 
respectively.
Like in previous sections, some industries show low tariff-equivalent levels for both the 
internal and the external border. This is the case of ‘‘Textile’’, ‘‘Electric&electronic goods’’‘and 
‘‘Transport equipment’’. These three industries mainly produce high differentiated ﬁnal goods. 
They are relatively independent from immobile factor endowments, and they have a large 
propensity to export to other regions and countries.
Conversely, other industries show both high tariff-equivalent internal and external border 
effects. This is the case of ‘‘Agriculture’’, ‘‘Food&Beverages’’ and ‘‘Non metallic, mineral 
products’’, which register high levels of intra-regional trade shares, compared to their low 
shares of inter-regional and inter-national trade ﬂows. In the case of ‘‘Agriculture’’, although 
there is a long tradition of exporting
Table 3 Product differentiation interaction terms
(1) (2) (3)
1.09** (27.03) 1.06** (26.39) 1.06** (24.12)
0.96** (47.63) 0.97** (47.87) 0.97** (46.04)
0.73** (19.88) 0.80** (17.53) 0.95** (21.05)
1.50** (12.71) 1.47** (12.58) 1.46** (12.07)
2.18** (6.86) 2.22** (7.05) 2.30** (7.02)
0.37* (1.78)
0.57** (2.01)
0.32 (0.62)
6.01** (11.68) 5.55** (17.10) 4.71** (12.16)
2.10* (1.76)
0.56** (4.88)
0.09 (0.68)
2.55** (16.65) 2.52** (21.53) 1.75** (11.41)
1.78** (4.52)
0.50** (11.80)
0.10** (2.27)
0.14 0.15 0.15
22440 22440 20944
31.8 20.7 19.3
28.4 20.3 19.4
12.8 12.4 5.8
ln Yi,k
ln Yj
ln Dij
ADJREGij
ADJCOUij
IITk
R&Dk
ADVk
OWNREGij
OWNREG*IITk
OWNREG*R&Dk 
OWNREG*ADVk
SPAINij
SPAIN*IITk
SPAIN*R&Dk
SPAIN*ADVk
Pseudo R2
N
Estimated border effects Internal 
(homogenous good) Internal 
(differentiated good) External 
(homogenous good) External 
(differentiated good) 6.8 10.4 5.6
Estimated border effects for differentiated goods evaluated at average value (IIT = 0.36; R&D = 1.61; ADV = 1.64). 
Tobit estimations, sample mean elasticities. All speciﬁcations industry speciﬁc exporter and importer dummies. IIT 
intra industry trade index, R&D research and development expenditure over value added, ADV advertising 
expenditure over sales (agriculture is excluded due to lack of data). t statistics in parentheses with ** denoting 
signiﬁcance at the 5% level and * signiﬁcance at the 10% level
agricultural products in Spain, a large part of the output is used as intermediate inputs 
in the ‘‘‘Food&drinks’’’ industry. Something similar could be said about the products from 
the ‘Food& drinks’ industry, which are used as intermediate inputs by
Table 4 Tariff equivalent border effects (%)
Border effect Tariff equivalent border effect
Panel A: internal border
6.8 51
12.1 59
8.0 60
12.8 62
16.8 67
17.1 68
3.4 68
29.4 69
26.0 70
28.5 74
35.2 74
18.9 80
37.3 82
22.2 92
Chemicals
Textile, clothing, leather Enery & 
water
Electric & electronic goods 
Transport equipment
Steel & metal products Mining
Rubber & plastic
Paper & printing
Other manufactures
Non metallic, mineral products 
Mechanical machinery
Food & drinks
Agriculture
Wood products
45.6 104
Panel B: external border
4.2 49
6.8 53
5.8 54
8.0 54
4.5 55
12.2 56
15.0 65
24.0 69
15.0 77
35.5 79
52.5 81
37.0 82
46.5 114
186.8 127
Electric & electronic goods Textile, 
clothing, leather Transport 
equipment
Rubber & plastic
Mechanical machinery Chemicals
Other manufactures
Paper & printing
Wood products
Steel & metal products
Non metallic, mineral products 
Food & drinks
Agriculture
Enery & water
Mining
156.0 460
^bk
Industries ordered by magnitude of the tariff equivalent border effect. The tariff equivalent border effect is equal to 
expð 
.
^rkÞ  1
h i
where bk refer to the estimated coefﬁcients of the border effects and rk is
the estimated elasticity of substitution. We have used the variable IIT index in the calculations, which varies 
between 0.03 (mining) and 0.66 (mechanical machinery). Higher values indicate more differen tiated products. 
We set the two endpoints of the elasticity range (2 6) to the minimum and maximum IIT index values, and used 
linear interpolation to assign elasticities to the intervening industries, based on their ITT index values (as in 
Evans 2003)
the local service sectors (Retailing, restaurants and hotels). Finally, the high border effects 
found for the ‘‘Non metallic, mineral products’’ industry is coherent with the results obtained 
abroad (Chen 2004; Head and Mayer 2002), where bulk commodities tend to 
travel very short distances, because of their low transportability and high elasticity of 
substitution with similar products from the potential destination.
Finally, we ﬁnd a group of industries whose products show large difference between the 
tariff equivalent of internal and external border effect. For example, in the case of ‘‘Wood 
products’’, the tariff equivalent internal border effect is the highest one (104) while the external 
is around the average (77). This result could be explained taking into account that most part 
of its output is an intermediate input for ‘‘Other industries’’ (i.e. furniture), that tend to 
agglomerate in the same region where wood is more abundant. At the same time, one may 
ﬁnd strong ‘‘inﬂows’’ of expensive wood products imported from non-European countries. 
Another interesting result is the one obtained for the ‘‘Energy&water’’ industry, where the tariff 
equivalent internal border effect is among the lowest (60) while the external one is among the 
highest (127). In order to understand this result, it is important to remember that the utilities 
distribution system (electricity, gas and water) in Spain is poorly integrated with the European 
network, and most part of the national production is consumed within the country. At the same 
time, the low level of tariff equivalent internal border effect is explained by a relative large 
level of inter-regional trade of energy, induced by the fact that the production is concentrated 
in some regions (those with hydraulic, nuclear and thermal facilities) while the consumption 
does in others (highly populated and industrialised regions). Another issue that increases the 
internal border effect in that industry is the strong presence of headquarters located in Madrid 
region, whose strong output is mainly exported to the rest of the country and just a small 
share is allocated in Madrid region.
Another interesting result is that the negative correlation between the internal and external 
border effects disappears after conditioning on the elasticities of substitution. 
However, the internal and external tariff-equivalent border barriers remain high after 
discounting for the elasticities of substitution, so further investigation is needed to 
explain the large border barriers implied by the estimated border effects.
5.2 The role of intermediate goods and geographic location of ﬁrms
As it was mentioned before, border effects may arise endogenously due to the geographic 
location of particular industries. Firms that produce intermediates may locate proximate to 
concentrated industrial demands in order to minimize shipping costs. Although there are 
several possible cases, the most common result is to ﬁnd that intermediate goods tend to be 
shipped short distances while ﬁnal goods travel long distances.
Hillberry (2002), Hillberry and Hummels (2003) and Chen (2004) have investigated to what 
extent border effects are affected by ﬁrm location. They use an index of geographic 
concentration to measure to what extent ﬁrm’s production is tied to any particular geographic 
location and ﬁnd that that the border effect is larger
in industries with high geographic concentration. They interpreted this result as evidence that 
ﬁrms not attached to any speciﬁc location choose their location of production so as to 
minimise cross-border transaction cost and as a result border effects are magniﬁed.
We adopt a different approach and compare border effects for trade in ﬁnal goods and 
trade in intermediate goods. If intermediate goods are shipped shorter distances than ﬁnal 
goods, border effects will be bigger for intermediates than for ﬁnal goods. Our analysis is 
carried out with the ﬁrst Interregional input output table available for the Spanish economy 
(referred to the year 2000), which separates interregional bilateral trade ﬂows into goods for 
intermediate use and goods for ﬁnal use (Llano 2004a, b; P ´e rez et al. 2009). Unfortunately, 
there is no information on international bilateral trade ﬂows by type of good, so we 
concentrate the analysis on interregional trade ﬂows of ﬁnal goods and intermediate goods. In 
addition our measure of geographic concentration by economic activity is only available for 
manufacturing industries. Hence the new sample is reduced to 3468 observations (17 9 17 
region pairs 9 12 industries).
Panel A in Table 5 displays the results of estimating Eq. 1. There are some interesting 
differences in the estimated coefﬁcients between column 1 in Table 5 and column 5 in Table 
1. First, the coefﬁcient on distance is -0.26, signiﬁcantly smaller than the one obtained when 
we include international trade data. Second, the estimated internal border effect takes a value 
of 35.2, which is bigger than the one found when we used both international and interregional 
trade ﬂows (29.7).
Table 5 Separating interregional trade ﬂows by ﬁnal and intermediate goods
All manuf.
(1)
Intermediates
(2)
Final
(3)
All manuf.
(4)
Intermediates
(5)
Final
(6)
ln Yi,k 1.53**
(36.51)
1.49**
(38.32)
1.34**
(36.82)
1.52**
(41.20)
1.49**
(41.97)
1.35**
(41.21)
ln Yj 1.11**
(6.48)
1.12** (6.31) 0.86**
(4.53)
1.10**
(10.88)
1.13**
(10.95)
0.88**
(10.80)
ln Dij 0.26**
(2.17)
0.37**
(2.82)
0.26**
(2.63)
0.29**
(3.88)
0.38**
(4.58)
0.28**
(4.25)
ADJREG 2.61**
(15.07)
2.51**
(15.20)
2.14**
(13.53)
2.63**
(17.07)
2.51**
(17.18)
2.18**
(16.64)
ln CRk 1.21 (1.05) 1.56 (1.49) 1.01* (1.66)
OWNREG 3.56**
(14.01)
3.43**
(14.53)
2.87**
(13.41)
3.47**
(13.42)
3.31**
(14.88)
2.81**
(15.56)
OWNREG 9
ln(CRk)
0.39
(1.52)
0.11 (1.28) 0.23*
(1.88)
Pseudo R2 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.25 0.26 0.27
N 3468 3468 3468 3468 3468 3468
Internal border 35.2 30.9 17.6 32.1 29.7 16.6
Manufactures excludes agriculture, mining, and energy & water sectors. Tobit estimations, sample mean elasticities. 
All speciﬁcations include industry speciﬁc exporter and importer dummies. t Statistics in parentheses with ** and * 
denoting signiﬁcance at the 5% level and 10% level, respectively
Columns 2 and 3 split the sample into ﬁnal goods and intermediate goods. The domestic 
border effect for intermediate goods is 30.9 while the one for ﬁnal goods is 17.6. Our ﬁnding 
corroborates the idea that the composition of trade ﬂows affects the magnitude of the border 
effect. In particular, the internal border effect is almost twice larger for intermediate goods 
than for ﬁnal goods.
Next we investigate whether the clustering of ﬁrms may provide an additional explanation 
of border effects. In order to investigate this hypothesis, we use the index of ‘‘geographic 
concentration’’ proposed by Ellison and Glaeser (1997) and computed by Alonso Villar et al. 
(2003) for Spanish industries at the two-digit SIC level and provincial level in 1999.20 When 
there is no spatial concentration in a particular industry, the value of the Ellison and Glaeser 
(EG) index takes value zero. Panel B in Table 5 displays the results of estimating Eq. 2 
including the intercept-shift term In(CRk) and interaction term OWNREGx ln (CRk). As 
expected, highly geographically industries export more goods to other regions but also 
industries with a small value of the Ellison and Glaeser index display larger border effects. 
Interestingly, conditioning on geographic clustering seems to have a large and signiﬁcant 
impact on the magnitude of the internal border for ﬁnal goods than for intermediate goods. 
Moreover, the coefﬁcient on the interaction term for intermediate goods trade is not 
statistically signiﬁcant. Our results are in line with previous ﬁndings by Evans (2003) and 
Chen (2004) and support the hypothesis that ﬁrms that are not tied to any speciﬁc location 
locate so as to minimise trade costs. As a result, interregional trade is reduced and the 
magnitude of the border effect is partly explained by economic geography reasons rather than 
trade barriers.
6 Conclusions
This paper estimates the magnitude of the internal and international border effects in Spanish 
trade using a data set of intra-national and international trade ﬂows by industry. The gravity 
model shows that intraregional Spanish trade exceeds the interregional trade around 30 times 
and that intra-national Spanish trade exceeds the international trade around 10 times, after 
controlling for size, distance, adjacency and industry-speciﬁc characteristics. The magnitude 
of the international border effect is very small when compared with the results found in 
previous studies for Spain. The use of disaggregated trade information matters for the size of 
the border effect. Industry-speciﬁc border effects were also explored. The internal border 
effect by industry ranges between 6 times (chemicals) and 46 times (wood products), and the 
external border effect ranges between 4 (transport equipment) and 156 (energy and water). 
These wide differences suggest that the border effect is not uniform across industries.
The paper also investigates the determinants of the border effects across 
industries. Our analysis shows that controlling for product differentiation decreases
20 Notice that the use of information on geographic concentration for 1999 and trade ﬂows for 2000
alleviates the problem of endogeneity between the geographic location of ﬁrms and trade ﬂows.
the size of the border effects. Therefore, the elasticity of substitution among varieties drives 
the cross-industry variance in border effects. Moreover, product differentiation seems to be 
more important in explaining inter-industry differences in the external border effect than in the 
internal border effect. Next we ﬁnd that the magnitude of the internal border effect is much 
larger for trade in intermediate goods than trade in ﬁnal goods. Finally we show that 
conditioning on the geographic concentration of the industry reduces the magnitude of the 
internal border effect.
Finally we note that after accounting for the role of product differentiation, the use of the 
product (intermediate/ﬁnal goods) and the importance of spatial concentration of economic 
activity, the border effect remain high. This ‘‘puzzle’’ results needs further analysis. One 
possible explanation was provided recently by Hillberry and Hummels (2008), who show that 
the larger the geographical unit, the greater the border effect is. Therefore it would be 
interesting to repeat our research using a different geographical unit (say, provinces) and 
check whether this hypothesis hold for the case of Spain.
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Appendix
See Table 6.
Table 6 Descriptive statistics
N Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Sample of Spanish regions and OECD countries
Industry speciﬁc bilateral
exports
EXPijk 22440 37532 174779 0 5859986
Industry speciﬁc value added
of exporter
VABik 22440 542901 749605 5850 5571544
Total value added of importer VABTOTj 22440 9617075 29700000 0 257000000
Geodesic distance DISTANCEij 22440 2874 4225 17 19683
Dummy regional adjacency ADJREGij 22440 0.076 0.265 0 1
ADJCOUij 22440 0.008 0.089 0 1Dummy country adjacency 
Dummy intraregional trade OWNREGij 22440 0.023 0.149 0 1
Dummy international trade SPAINij 22440 0.364 0.481 0 1
Sample of Spanish regions
Industry speciﬁc bilateral
exports
expijk 3468 74176 259842 0 6259986
Bilateral exports in intermediate
goods
exp
INTERM ijlk
3468 70234 261233 0 4832343
3468 71892 275420 0 4987349
of exporter
Bilateral exports in ﬁnal goods exp FINALijk Industry 
speciﬁc value added VABik 3468 542901 749659 5850 5571544
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